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DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD: LAND USE EXACfIONS
AFTER NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
by Lynda L. Butler·
On March 23, 1994, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, a takings case involving conditions attached to approval of a building permit. No.
93-518, 62 U.S.L. W. 3689 (U.S. Apr: 19, 1994). In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that conditions requiring the applicants of a building permit to dedicate
portions of their land for storm drainage ·improvement and for a pedestrian/bicycle path did not
constitute an unconstitutional taking because the conditions bore an essential nexus to the
development of the property and therefore were reasonably related to the impact of the
development of the property. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
The landowners in Dolan applied for a permit that would allow them to expand the use of their
land. 854 P.2d at 438. The conditions were imposed under a city code provision allowing the
imposition of conditions to development in order to provide for projected transportation and
public facility needs. Id. The issues on appeal to the United States Supreme Court concerned
the appropriate relationship that the government had to demonstrate between the conditions
imposed on development and the state interest--that is, between the government exaction and the
impact of development
The Oregon court, in upholding the conditions under the takings clause, rejected the
applicants' argument that the United States Supreme Court had, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test in favor of a
more stringent standard of "substantial relationship" or "essential nexus."l As the state court
explained, the Supreme Court in Nollan had noted that its nexus approach was '''consistent with
the approach taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of
the California state courts.''' Dolan, 854 P.2d at 442 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839).
Although the Court in Nollan had stated that constitutional problems would exist if a condition
imposed in place of a development ban "utterly fail[ed] to further the end advanced as the

OMs. Butler is a Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary, in Williamsburg, Virginia, Editor of the Fee Simple, and a member of the Board of Governors of
the Real Property Section of the Virginia State Bar.
IThe United States Supreme Court, in Nollan, concluded that the condition imposed by the California
Coastal Commission on the owners of a beach front lot in exchange for permission to rebuild was not even
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest The condition had required the lotowners to grant the
public lateral access across their lot to enable the public to pass to and from public beach areas located
to the north and south of the lot. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the permit
condition failed to promote any of the public interests purportedly served by the condition of public
access. Those interests included preserving the public's visual access to the beach, minimizing
psychological barriers to using public beaches created by intensified coastal development, and limiting
beach congestion resulting from development. See 483 U.S. at 828-29, 838-42.
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justification" for the ban and had referred to this relationship as an "essential nexus," 483 U.S.
at 837, the Oregon court did not interpret that passage as requiring a more stringent nexus test.
Rather, as the Oregon court explained, the passage indicated that "for an exaction to be
considered 'reasonably related' to an impact, it is essential to show a nexus between the two."
Dolan, 8S4 P.2d at 443. A condition will be reasonably related to an impact, under the Oregon
court's reading of Nollan, if the condition "serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit
would serve." Id.
Questions presented for review by the Supreme Court focused on the Oregon court's
interpretation and application of Nollan.2 The first question concerned whether Nollan requires
a "'substantially related' degree of judicial scrutiny of exaction and its 'essential nexus' to
impacts of proposed development, rather than [the] 'reasonably related' degree of scrutiny used
by [the] Oregon Supreme Court." Dolan, 62 U.S.L. W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1993). The second
question asked whether the state court erred in holding a legally sufficient nexus existed if the
findings made by the local government imposing the conditions demonstrate "only potential
increase in intensity of use, rather than bona fide impact directly caused by development." Id.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the questions presented by Dolan hopefully will clarify
much of the uncertainty surrounding the Nollan opinion. On the one hand, Nollan appears to
heighten the test for establishing a valid police power regulation. Although that test traditionally
involved a substantive due process inquiry into whether the regulation was reasonably related to
valid police power objectives,3 the Court in Nollan appears to use a different nexus test in
evaluating the legitimacy of a regulation under the takings clause. After describing the takings
test as requiring the regulation to '''substantially advance[ ] legitimate state interests,'" Nollan,
483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 2SS, 260 (1980», Justice Scalia explains
in a footnote that this standard is indeed "different" from the due process nexus test, ide at 834
n.3. On the other hand, other aspects of Nollan suggest that a more limited interpretation is

2Petitioners did not present any question concerning the treatment by the Oregon Supreme Court of
the petitioners' physical takings argument. In a footnote the state court had rejected petitioners' argument
thai the city's dedication conditions resulted in a permanent physical occupation of a portion of their land
and therefore amounted to a per se taking. The court explained that occupation of petitioners' land would
occur only with their permission. Petitioners, in other words, could avoid physical occupation of their land
by withdrawing their permit application. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Yee V. City of
Escondido, 112 S. O. 1522 (1992), the Oregon court stressed that a physical taking can occur only when
government "'requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.'" Dolan, 854 P.2d
at 441 n.8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Yee, 112 S. O . at 1528).
'See, e.g., Village of Euclid V. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88, 395-97 (1926); Sellon V.
City of Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229, 232-33 (Colo. 1987); County of Pine V. State, 280 N.W.2d 625,
629-30 (Minn. 1979); West Bros. Brick Co. V. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281-82, 192 S.E. 881,
885 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937); Reesman v. State,445 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wash. 1968).
See generally ROGER OJNNINGHAM ET AL., 1HE LAw OF PROPERlY § 9.2 (1984) (discussing the police
power, the due process clause, and the takings clause).
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appropriate. As the Dolan court noted, for example, the majority in Nollan describes its nexus
approach as consistent with the approach of most other courts, see ide at 839-40, and stresses that
its test has, for years, applied in the takings field, see ide at 834. Additionally, the majority in
Nollan concluded that the public access condition imposed on the lotowners could not even be
justified under a reasonable relationship test. Id. at 838-42. Finally, the Court in Nollan was
especially concerned about the fact that the permit condition required an "actual conveyance of
property," which creates a "heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective." Id. at 841. The Supreme Court's
handling of Dolan hopefully will resolve the debate about the precedential effect of Nollan.
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